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ABSTRACT 
The goal of the thesis is to explore economic intelligence. The work includes the 
analysis of open sources. The approach to the issue of economic intelligence is based on 
the analysis of the state's economic security. The research presents the views of 
politicians, intelligence professionals, and scientists. It proposes possible objectives and 
missions of economic intelligence. Additionally, the research investigates the usefulness 
and reliability of open sources of economic analysis. 
The second goal of the thesis is the analysis of modern schools of intelligence and 
classifications of intelligence by levels and components. Next, the work analyzes modern 
economic intelligence exploring its structure and activities. Then the work compares the 
intelligence process of public and private economic intelligence. 
The third goal is to analyze the economic intelligence system of the modern state 
by using the economic intelligence system of Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Russian 
Federation, and United States as models for an economic intelligence system. 
Furthermore, the work points out the principal features of each system. 
Finally, the research offers conclusions about the use and development of 
economic intelligence for the state. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This research investigates the issue of economic intelligence (El). It covers the 
end-of-the 20th century. The need for conducting El is based on the necessity of providing 
economic security for the state. The research uses open sources of information. The work 
focuses on both the state and private economic intelligence. The main objectives of the 
thesis are to define the justification for using economic intelligence by the state, estimate 
the principal goals of economic intelligence, and identify the problematic areas of EL The 
classification of El is another goal because no clear description of types, levels, targets, 
and process of El exist. All activities of El are presented in environments that have 
economic intelligence system (EIS). Since there are some patterns of different economic 
intelligence systems, the analysis of the existing EIS was done to assess systems. The 
research proposes the areas of the state's concern about economic intelligence. The role of 
the modern state is dominant in organizing economic intelligence systems. It must set the 
rules for conducting El and participating in this process of competitive intelligence. The 
state is also responsible for the decision to share information with the private economy. 
The first chapter, "Economic Intelligence is the New Challenge of the XXI 
Century," emphasizes the importance of the subject of research by analyzing the problem 
of economic security and the role of El in security. It describes defensive and offensive 
strategies of intelligence and shows the possible priorities for EL It analyzes the possible 
approaches of El, which are analysis, defensive, and offensive strategies. It explores the 
arguments for involving the state in economic intelligence activities. It also discusses the 
benefits and weaknesses of economic analysis and how it differs from El. 
The second chapter "Economic Intelligence and its Classification" deals with 
research on EL It considers the classification of modern schools of intelligence, levels of 
activities, and its components. Next, the chapter proposes a typology of El and classifies 
El by the levels of its activity. This chapter compares the economic intelligence process 
of the state and private intelligence organizations. 
The third chapter, "Analysis of State's Economic Intelligence Systems" 
investigates the elements of the intelligence system. The approach to the economic 
intelligence system is made based on the information revolution. The chapter explores the 
comparison of national economic intelligence systems, highlighting the differences state's 
positions on El. The analysis shows that cultural traditions, the position of the state 
toward the control of its economy, and development of intelligence community are 
important factors in creating an economic intelligence system. These factors are important 
in choosing the national economic intelligence strategy. This chapter suggests that the 
state should support the development of state and private El institutions. Finally, the 
educational system is shown to be an important element of the economic intelligence 
system. 
II. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE IS THE NEW CHALLENGE OF THE XXI 
CENTURY 
The end of the twentieth century brought a new challenge to national security. The 
collapse of the Berlin wall in 1989 changed the balance among world powers. The issue 
of national security is now more connected to the economic strength. The condition of a 
state's economy may be more vital than its military capability. There is a swing from a 
political-military emphasis of the intelligence mission to a political-economic one. Peter 
Schweizer supports the conclusion of Maynard Anderson, of the Defense Science Board 
at the Department of Defense, that: 
[T]here is a "new reality," in which the advancement and application of 
the technology has become globalized, effectively replacing territory as the 
new determination of world power. Success at exploiting new technologies 
for economic and military purposes, as concludes the board, will 
determine the relative power of the competing states. The relative standing 
of the ex-Soviet Union and Japan in the world-power equation is 
particularly instructive in this regard. In the end, territorial expansion did 
not offer the Soviet Union staying power. Its economy was in utter 
shambles. In contrast, Japan is an economic powerhouse with limited 
military power. Moreover, increasingly Japan has a larger say in 
international affairs by virtue of its economic power, despite the fact that 
the Soviet Union possessed a population and a land mass many times the 
size of Japan's and enormous nuclear potential.1 
The technology, communication, and computer revolutions show "the global 
economy" as evidence of the end of the twentieth century. The global economy erased 
any differences, as well as barriers, between the national economies and the global 
economy. As a result, many national economies became mutually linked and dependent 
Schweizer, Peter, Friendly Spies: how America's allies are using espionage to steal our secrets (New 
York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993), 30. The economy of Japan now suffers from internal economic 
malfunctions, but it has enormous savings that are invested throughout the world. 
on each other. The world markets, such as New York, Chicago, Tokyo, London, Munich, 
have dictated the rules of the economic game. The transnational corporations enforced the 
process of the globalization of the economy, but they did not eliminate economic crime 
and corruption. For example, economic losses for U.S. based companies are about $260 
billion a year and $140 billion in overseas operations.2 
The actual development of modern El started after World War II. The Japanese, 
Soviet, and French intelligence did more than other intelligence services in developing 
this branch of intelligence. Snyder says that "three chief offenders are Russia, which is 
preparing an economic spying blitz, Japan, which basically stole the United States market 
share in the microchip industry in the early 1980's, and France, a strong diplomatic ally 
that is very aggressive in its espionage efforts, having been known to deploy agents to 
search the briefcases of United States businessmen."3 The up-to-date statistics indicate 
that economic espionage is growing. Thus, in the United States the FBI, in 1997, 
investigated about 800 cases, twice the number it was in 1994. This growth is a big issue 
in counterintelligence activities. 
As a result of the new threat, the U.S. intelligence community has had to rearrange 
its forces according to the current situation. The same trends are evident for other states. 
Schweizer says, "the intelligence community must redefine itself and its mission to meet 
2
 Diane C.Snyder, Economic Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues for Reforms. Available [online]: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/economic.htm/; accessed July 15, 2000, p.l. 
3
 Diane C.Snyder, Economic Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues for Reforms. Available [online]: 
http^VwNv^'.fas.orq/irp/eprint'snvder/economic.htm/: accessed July 15, 2000, p.l. 
the new challenges facing the United States, or it risks dramatic cuts or even extinction."4 
Similar processes are common for many intelligence communities around the world. 
A. ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE IN 
THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 
This chapter analyzes open sources economic intelligence. The analysis will start 
with describing economic security and the role of El as the means of enforcement of the 
state's economic security (ES). The analysis, using the works and opinions of A. Arbatov, 
D. Deconcini, N. Galvan, G. Hastedt, J. Nolan, S. Porteous, D. Snyder, R. Woolsey, and 
P. Zelikow, sets clear view of the role of El in the modem state. First, it uses the positions 
of politicians, intelligence professionals, writers, and scientists dealing with El, which 
establish a base for the possible use of El. Second, the chapter describes El as the type of 
human and social activity that creates a strong base for understanding the core of El 
activities. It gives the classification of types and levels of intelligence. Additionally, the 
research points out issues that were not covered, such as possible cooperation of the 
state's El services, and the openness of economic data in the time of war. Finally, this 
chapter discusses the different cultural approaches to the El issue and their impact on the 
El system of a state. 
B. ECONOMIC SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE 
The 1990's attracted much attention to the economy because of increased 
economic interdependence of state economies and the high level of global competition. 
4
 Schweizer, Peter, Friendly Spies: how America's allies are using espionage to steal our secrets (New 
York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993), p.284. 
5 
These developments are major reasons for contemporary competition among world 
powers. Thus, the national economies require a new conception of the governmental 
involvement in the economic area. It requires correct and up-to-date coordinated 
economic policies of government. George W.Bush, President of United States "had asked 
his national security adviser and his chief of economic adviser... to 'share a desk' that 
would work to coordinate the United States' foreign policy objectives with its economics 
strategy."5 The position of George Bush points out how dependent and interlinked the 
state economy and national security are. The epoch of Cold Peace increased the role of 
economy so much that the situation could not be improved without governmental actions. 
Many states see the possible solution in improving their economic security by using not 
only regular controlling tools, but also intelligence and counterintelligence measures. The 
issue of economic security and El is discussed more in the United States than in other 
states. There are many positions on the role of El as the key element in enforcing the 
state's ES. The economic intelligence in the United States is more open for study than 
others. The United States involvement in El started with a 1949 review study of the 1947 
National Security Act. Furthermore, the creation of the Office of Research Reports in 
1949 had goals for collecting and analyzing economic information. In 1951, the National 
Security Council tasked the CIA and other government offices with the responsibility of 
providing it with foreign economic intelligence. Now, however, according to Philip 
Zelikow, "the greatest concentration of analytical expert on international economic issue 
5
 David E.Sanger, Bush to Add Economists to National Security Staff, New York Times Service 
Wednesday, January 17,2001. Available [online]: http://w-\vw.iht.com'cgi- 
bin/'generic.cgi?template=articleprint.tmplh&Arricled=78/; accessed January 16, 2001, p. 1. 
in the federal governments resides not in any of the executive department, but in the 
Central Intelligence Agency."6 He says that one-third of analysts in the CIA are working 
on economic issues. He says the next priorities of El are the following: 
Maintaining economic files on states 
Forecasting of macroeconomic development of state and its policy 
Checking the effects of the economic sanctions 
Monitoring debt problems 
Observing financial markets and financial activities of financial institutions 
Uncovering unfair business practices. 
The U.S. President and Congress, with support of scientists and intelligence 
professionals, heavily investigated this phenomenon in the 1990's making appropriate 
decisions to increase national ES. For example, RJames Woolsey, the first Director of 
Central Intelligence of President Clinton's administration, said 
Economic security takes its place among the central issue of American 
foreign policy.... This does not mean that we are in the business of spying 
on foreign business to give their secrets to American companies. But it 
does mean that we bring foreign bribery, for example, to attention of the 
White House and State and Commerce Departments.7 
The state's economic security is the system of state activities supporting constant, 
fast, and efficient development of the national economy. "The role of intelligence services 
is in protecting and pursuing a state's economic and commercial interests of major 
6
 Philip Zelikow, American Intelligence and the World Economy, in From the Cold: The Report of the 
Twentieth Century Funds Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence (New Yourk: Twentieth Century 
Fund Press, 1999), p.61. 
7
 RJames Woolsey, Intelligence Quotient: The Mission of the CIA in a New World, Harvard International 
Review, 1994, pp.34-37. 
interests, particularly the manner by which Western powers have begun to approach this 
issue since the end of the Cold War."8 It has to maximize the use of national comparative 
advantages, such as location for Singapore or cheap labor in the case of the Chinese, and 
secure its economy from any adversary action that can cause the loss of advantages. For 
example, Japanese economy and its legal base make it difficult to start any kind of 
business within its national territory. Besides this, the national culture of Japan promotes 
the consumption of national products. 
The term of the national security system is intangible because it is difficult to 
present it. The ES system is based on the existing state's institutions of state power and 
their elements, such as the Treasury Department, Commerce Department, Economic 
Departments, Custom Agency, Internal Revenue Service, and Economic Police. The 
name of the agencies, departments, and directorates can vary, but all of them are involved 
in economic activities from establishing or initiating the legal issues to executing the law, 
orders, and guidance. There are different approaches for measuring ES. The main goals of 
the economic security system are achieving stable economic growth of the national 
economy and a high quality of life for its citizens. Economic security as the element of 
the state security system requires informational support not only from the feedback 
channels, but also from the analytical institutions and intelligence as well. Therefore, ES 
requires support that can be realized by EL Recently, the issue of El was not so critical 
because of the low level of economical globalization and specialization. Potter says that 
8
 Samuel D.Porteous, "Economic/Commercial Interests and the World's Intelligence Services: A Canadian 
Perspective," Internationaljournal of Intelligence and Counterlntelligence, Volume 8, No3, Fall 1995, 
p.276. 
8 
"a paradox of globalization the increased competitiveness of firms on a global scale has 
forced nation-states to reconsider the structure of their national economics intelligence 
systems, their domestic legal regimes, and the mandates of their intelligence services."9 
There are two types of intelligence strategy. One is defensive, and the second is 
offensive. The state is responsible for choosing the intelligence strategy and its 
realization. Many factors influence the choice of the strategy, such as socio-political 
organization of state, culture, internal and external legal base, and economic values. 
These factors define the state's decision on the issue of the mandate for EL The mandate 
is the legal decision of the state on conducting EL It sets the base for establishing the 
agenda and accepting the methods of EL For E. Potter, two elements of state economy, 
such as public and private agents are very important for establishing and conducting EL 
He says that El has had enormous impact on the policy-making process and effectiveness 
of El for national economy. He uses the argument of Samuel Porteous about two 
problematic issues of EL First, Porteous says that it is necessary to integrate El into the 
state policy-making process. The second problem concerns the dissemination of the 
economic intelligence to the private sector of economy in which most of the states did not 
make a final decision on the distribution of the state's El resources to the private sector. 
The problem of economic security is under constant control of any state. Each 
branch of the state tries to do the best in developing and conducting EL The United States 
Senate, for instance, works under the issue of El too. According to the Senator Dennis 
DeConcini (D., Ariz.), the chair of Intelligence Committee, the state has to support and 
9
 Evan H.Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, (Carleton University Press, 1998), p.2. 
9 
strengthen the international position of its industry by all appropriate means, including the 
use of intelligence, governed by the following principles: 
• The intelligence community should continue to support governmental 
requirements and not attempt to satisfy private ones. 
• 
• 
The intelligence community should refrain from activities that would 
prompt retaliation. 
The intelligence community should continue to focus on non-public 
information. 
Intelligence should be defensive in nature and be applied systematically 
and evenhandedly. 
Offensive measures should not be ruled out but kept as an option when all 
other efforts fail. 
These principles do not include the issue of timeliness and permanence that are 
common for any kind of intelligence. 
Next, the Senator explained his vision of the preferable areas of economic 
intelligence that coincide with the position of many scientists, intelligence professionals, 
and politicians: 
• Collection of information on unfair trade practice. 
• Monitoring trade agreements and international control regimes. 
• Providing information to government agencies. 
• Making satellite imagery commercially available to U.S. business 
providing counter-intelligence support.10 
10
 Dennis DeConcini, "The Role of U.S.Intelligence in Promoting Economic Interests", Journal of 
International Affairs 48,1994, pp.39-57. 
10 
EI may contribute to maintenance of the state' ES. There are three possible 
functions of El that are more useful than others: economic analysis, defense intelligence, 
known as the counterintelligence, and offensive intelligence. Robert Galvan defines 
clearly each function of El activities. First, economic analysis (EA) is more open and 
accessible for both governmental and private organizations. It consists of the statistical 
data that covers all economic aspects. "This function, to be useful, must continue to be 
tailored to the specific needs of U.S. policymakers and foreign businessmen, to allow 
them to stay abreast of the latest developments in economics and technology."11 Second, 
the intelligence community is more capable of conducting defensive (counterintelligence) 
activities. This function "is not only the least controversial area of economic intelligence, 
but a general consensus regarding its possible use has already developed." (R. Galvan, 
356) The methods and sources of El are not opened to the public and have to wait for 
legal decision. Galvan argues that IC should provide effective help to U.S. companies in 
their defensive actions. 
Third, offensive activities and industrial espionage did not get "widespread 
support for development of an offensive economic capability" in North America. 
(Galvan, 359) Galvan offers these assumptions based on the Northamerican cultural 
norms. On the other hand, the offensive El is preferred by other cultures. Japan, German, 
and French actively use it. Not only is El popular because of the cultural reasons, but also 
because of the lack of relative advantages in the labor force, capital, natural resources, 
and technologies that can make the state use El. Besides the ethical dilemma, the 
1
 * Robert N.Galvan, "The Role of American Intelligence in The Global Economy," International journal 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 8, No3, Fall 1995, p.355. 
11 
offensive EI can severely damage not only neighbors' economies, but also the economy 
of the state that conducts El. Next, Porteous says that El, which supports decisions of 
policymakers on economy, "is generally accepted as a legitimate function of national 
intelligence services. Related intelligence activities that go beyond the mere collection of 
information and aim directly [to] influence events either at macroeconomic or corporate 
level is understandably more controversial."12 
Economic security (ES), as a term, is a very broad definition that is often 
characterized by lack of coherent terminology. Porteous' definition of ES is more 
complete in covering all areas of this issue. 
Economic security is the maintenance of these conditions necessary to 
encourage sustained, long-term relative improvements in labor and capital 
productivity and thus a high and rising standard of living for a nation's 
citizens, including the maintenance of fair, secure and dynamic business 
environment conducive to innovation, domestic and foreign investment 
and sustainable economic growth.13 
The role of El, according to S.Porteous, is secondary in maintaining the state's 
ES. Despite the secondary role, El has to assist "in the maintenance of a fair, secure and 
dynamic business environment that is intelligence community's contribution to economic 
security is felt." 14 
12
 Samuel D.Porteous, "Economic/Commercial Interests and the World's Intelligence Services: A Canadian 
Perspective," Internationaljournal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Volume 8, No3, Fall 1995, 
p.277. 
13
 Samuel D.Porteous, "Economic Espionage: Issue Rising from Increased Governmental Involvement with 
Private Sector," Intelligence and National Security, Volume 9, October 1994, No4, p.736. 
14
 Samuel D.Porteous, "Economic Espionage: Issue Rising from Increased Governmental Involvement with 
Private Sector," Intelligence and National Security, Volume 9, October 1994, No4, p.736. 
12 
The issue of economic security can be also divided into a pure economic analysis, 
and scientific and technological intelligence. All these elements are quite different in their 
nature, but they are mainly elements of El. They can be mixed, and cannot exist 
separately. Therefore, they produce and add some value to economic security by enriching 
EL During the Cold War, economic analysis was dominant in the U.S community, while 
scientific and technological intelligence was dominant in the former USSR, France, and 
Japan. Today, Russia continues restructuring its IC. According to Alexey Arbatov, 
Deputy Head of the Parliamentary Commission on Defense and National Security of the 
Russian Federation, President Putin can enforce the role of state intelligence on the issue 
to enforce Russian economic security.15 
Glenn Hastedt proposes four factors that support the involvement of the state 
intelligence in the economic area. First, El, a complex activity of analytical process, 
requires the collection of information and data that is analyzed to create intelligence. The 
state has all the means and trained personnel to provide the state with qualified economic 
intelligence. Second, "questions [of El] are not self-defining. They are prone to 
conflicting interpretations over what to look at, how to measure what is observed, what 
questions to ask of the information collected, and how to interpret that information."16 
There are different approaches to measure economic performance. They can differ in data, 
but most of them can give similar results on general issues, such as the growth of the 
GNP, debt, and population. An analysis is limited by term that usually covers 2-5 years to 
15
 Answer received during briefing at NPS, September 2000. 
16
 Glenn Hastedt, "Seeking Economic Security Through Intelligence," Internationaljournal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, Volume 11, No4, Winter 1998-1999, p.389. 
13 
forecast. For example, bad statistics is a common feature for many poor countries having 
"...poor statistical services; data from certain sectors... are the worst of all."17 An 
analysis is highly sensitive to statistics. Third, El deals with 
puzzles and mysteries. Answers to puzzles exist and can be found through 
the accumulation of information. Mysteries have no true answers. 
Gathering and analyzing information helps analysts frame the answers, but 
there is never finality to them. Some element of doubt or uncertainty will 
always continue to exist.18 
The El process can exist in linear and circle mode. In many cases, it is the circle 
model of intelligence process, because it requires the constant monitoring of economic 
data and analysis, the opinion of experts working under issue of economic analysis and 
forecasting. Fourth, there is the problem of relations between consumers of El and 
analysts. Consumers of El have different goals and vision of El; therefore, they demand 
different types of intelligence. For example, the Treasury and Commerce Departments 
cannot be satisfied with similar El, so they establish their own requests on economic 
intelligence. They also have their own intelligence services that conduct the analytical and 
statistical surveys. 
El differs from other types of intelligence. El acquires the information mostly 
from open sources. According to G.Hastedt, clandestine reports only occupy third place 
based on the importance of intelligence reports. The open sources and overt reports 
contain most of the valuable information. The high level of openness of the economic 
17
 Malcom Gillis and others, Economics of Development, 4th edition, New York, 1996, pp.36-37. 
18
 Glenn Hastedt, "Seeking Economic Security Through Intelligence," Internationaljournal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, Volume 11, No4, Winter 1998-1999, p.389. 
14 
information gives access for both consumers and analysts. The lack of time is the reason 
why El should be used to help policymakers in using such broad economic information. 
Policymakers and planners do not ... have the time to sift through the 
mass of material that must be reviewed and digested. .. .The finished 
product of the analytical organization puts the information in context, 
points out its significance, and projects those judgments into the future.19 
Such openness decreases the need for qualified collectors of intelligence. The 
current inflow of economic information is perfect, but the question is will economic 
information become so open in wartime? There is no simple answer to the question. In 
case of a threat, the state will start to enforce its security measures for protecting itself 
against any hostile action, and tremendously cut the informational outflow. Therefore, the 
economic data and critical information will not be accessible through open sources. In 
wartime, informational hunger can be compensated partially by theoretical modeling and 
deducing, but it cannot support the decision-making process. 
There is another problem with the openness of economic information. It makes El 
different from others. Hastedt looks at three factors: first, there is a high level of 
competition among producers of El, such as governmental and non-governmental. This 
is a delicate issue because many governmental intelligence professionals continue their 
careers in private intelligence organizations after retirement or even before. "Talented 
economic analysts are in demand in the private sector. They are hired away from CIA to 
do lucrative private work.  Twenty percent turnover a year among trained economists is 
19
 Scott D.Breckenridge, The CIA and U.S.Intelligence System, Boulder (CO: Westview Press 1986), 
p. 154. 
15 
not uncommon."20 The high level of outflow of economic analysts from CIA is a good 
example of this problem. Second, the politicians are more interested in political and 
military intelligence, while business leaders - in EL Thus, El needs to stimulate the 
attention of policymakers. Politicians need more time to readjust their demands for 
economic intelligence. Third, the existing economic policies create some obstacles for 
dissemination of economic intelligence. Nowadays, the higher demands from private 
enterprises stimulate the growth of competitive intelligence. For example, the Society of 
Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) grew from 2,422 members in 1994 to 
6,700 in 1988.21 The issue of sharing the governmental El with private business is not 
easy, and will be discussed later. Therefore, "economic intelligence has multiple masters 
who are likely to have differing definitions of the problems and time frames within which 
to solve them."22 
Glenn Hastedt defines the focus of El 'is on risk arising from marketing practices, 
competition, the availability of inputs, and a macroeconomic trend that affects business 
performance."23 
Economic security depends strongly on political stability, and the macro-micro 
situation around the investigated problem. First, the economic performance is highly 
20
 Diane C.Snyder, Economic Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Issue for Reform. Available [online]: 
http://web.nps.navv.mil/~rloonev/4141  74.htm : accessed May 5, 2000, p.8. 
01 John Nolan, Confidential: Uncover Your Competitor's Top Business Secrets Legally and 
Quickly - and Protect Your Own (Phoenix Consulting Group, 1999), p. 107. 
22
 Glenn Hastedt, "Seeking Economic Security Through Intelligence," Internationaljournal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, Volume 11, No4, Winter 1998-1999, p.391. 
23
 Glenn Hastedt, "Seeking Economic Security Through Intelligence," International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, Volume 11, No4, Winter 1998-1999, p.392. 
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vulnerable to the present political situation. For example, the political revolutions, wars, 
and crises can initiate the withdrawal of capitals for both investors and the local economic 
elite. The threat of the expropriation of private assets has the same impact on the capital 
market. Instability is the main reason for moving the short-term investments that can 
support long-term development of the state economy and also hits the international 
markets. For example, the invasion of Kuwait drastically increased oil prices. The 
definition of the risk to one's security could be different, and it requires pre-established 
norms and factors for its assessment. Therefore, El is connected with political 
intelligence. 
Second, macro and micro risks are different in their nature. For the competitive 
intelligence, there are some problems. The political risk assessment models that focus on 
macro level of risk are unable to link general conditions of political instability to the level 
of the single enterprise that is threatened. There is not any connection between macro and 
micro levels. The micro level presents its own warning problems. If micro risks are not 
estimated correctly, they will lead to serious business problems. The macro risk is 
responsible for assessing all changes in state and global economy, such as a whole 
industry, regional and global market of raw materials, labor force, goods and others. 
Scientific knowledge and new technological inventions can boost some national 
economies and give them competitive advantages as well. 
In opposition to the macro risk, the micro risk acts within a narrow area, and it is 
designed to estimate the economic situation of some enterprises, one-product market, and 
financial risk for investment in some regimes or states.  The micro risk deals with legal 
17 
issue, tax norms, state regulatory system, and intellectual and technological 
proprietorships. A good example of legal misuse is the proliferation of software and video 
production in Eastern Europe. Therefore, state El has to cover different levels. This 
requires a great resource from the state that does not coincide with the tendency of 
worldwide downsizing of state structures. 
Third, negative information can carry some risks too. Thus, a decrease of 
industrial development can be a common situation on the market and stimulate economic 
activities somewhere. For example, the decline in the sales of personal computers does 
not indicate the crisis in this industry. Yet, it can be interpreted either as a decline or as a 
shift to personal digital assistants (PDA). 
The growth of El services in the organizations shows that many of them prefer to 
rely on their own services rather than use others. The trend was common for private 
economy in the 1990s. Next, some products are most popular among consumers of the 
analytical El, such as are country outlook, country data forecast, country risk monitor, etc. 
All these analyses do not cover the global economy, are not free and usually use the same 
data. 
Country Outlook examines the country's business, financial, and economic 
situation. It usually forecasts for the next two or five years. Country Data Forecast 
presents current financial yearly data and gives a five-year forecast for 23 indicators. 
Some of these are population and its estimated growth, real and absolute gross national 
product (GNP) with changes, GNP per capita, changes for consumers prices, actual 
account balance, external debt, and trade balance. Country Risk Monitor analyses the 
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current and future risk of states based on their economic, financial, and political data. It 
rates the states appropriately to the level of risk. The main factors for risk evaluation are 
the ratios of external debt to GNP, the state budget to GDP, external debt to exports, and 
debt service to exports. Profit Opportunity Recommendation includes three elements, 
such as Political Risk Index, Operations Risk Index, and Reparations Risk Index. 
The process of the analysis differs from the intelligence process. It includes the 
collection of the information obtained from the investigated state, an opinion of expertise, 
and the collective viewpoint of the group of experts usually from 5 to 250 people. The 
analysis also includes the quantity methods of research. This is proceeded statistical 
analyzed data. In addition, some agencies use their personnel. They conduct an opinion 
survey of their employee working in headquarters and in the analyzed countries as well. 
Therefore, a large variety of economic analysts and agencies conduct economic 
intelligence using open sources for collecting data and producing analyses. The analyses 
are similar to economic intelligence because they present not only an excellent 
description of the current economic situation, but also make a forecast for the future that 
is reliable in making many state decisions. However, "open sources cannot serve as a 
replacement for government intelligence. Government intelligence can serve as a useful 
'second engine,' confirming and disclaiming what is out there, and also providing new 
insights through its clandestine collection capabilities."24 
The necessity to maintain ES of the state is dominant in reaching a decision on 
conducting EL The role of El is secondary. El can enforce the ES of the state. There is no 
24
 Diane C.Snyder, Economic Intelligence in the Post-Cold War Era: Issues for Reforms. Available 
[online]: http://vv-wft'.fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/econoniic.htnT/: accessed July 15, 2000, p.3. 
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answer on the availability of economic information in wartime, so El can become a 
reliable producer of economic intelligence in the time of war. There is the range of 
opinions on the principles, functions, and priorities of El. (D. DeConcini, N. Galvan, P. 
Zelikow) They are reasonable and support the involvement of the state's intelligence 
community into El. (G. Hastedt) There is no answer on the preferable type of El strategy. 
Both defensive and offensive strategies can be used. (D. Deconcini) The strategic choice 
depends on many political, social, and cultural factors. The issue of sharing the state's 
economic intelligence with the private sector is still without answer. Many states support 
defensive El of the private economy, while a few others are also active in using offensive 
strategy. (Japan, France) In conclusion, the modem state is responsible for protecting and 
developing its economy and the well being of its citizens. It has to create and maintain an 
ES system. El is capable in supporting the state's activities by producing reliable, correct 
economic intelligence in time of peace and war. 
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III. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND ITS CLASSIFICATION 
Intelligence is the mental quality "that consists of the abilities to learn from 
experience, adapt to new situations, understand and handle abstract concepts, and use 
knowledge to manipulate one's environment."25 It is a human feature that was developed, 
studied, and transferred to every new generation. Many theorist believe that intelligence is 
more an ability or readiness than a genetic achievement. On the other hand, this word has 
a different definition concerning the ability of some organization, group or one individual 
to produce some piece of knowledge, which contains valuable information to be used for 
making some type of decision. 
Intelligence, as a type of social activity, is one of the most ancient professions in 
the world. Some even says that it is the second oldest profession. There are tremendous 
applications for intelligence. For example, it helps in many decision making processes, 
and gives an early forecast in every type of organization. All procedures of implementing 
intelligence have similar characteristics and features, using similar methods and models 
in gathering, analyzing, producing, and dissemination intelligence. Intelligence is 
conducted on different levels of activity with specific goals as well as targets. 
There are many definitions of intelligence, yet they can have different meanings. 
The most common are intelligence as process, as product, and as organization. The better 
definitions belong to M.Lowenthal who says 
25
 The New Encyclopedia Britanica, Volume 6,15™ edition, p.338. 
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Intelligence as process: Intelligence can be thought of as the means by 
which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, 
analyzed, and disseminated; and the way in which certain types of covert 
action are conceived and conducted. 
Intelligence as the product: Intelligence can be thought of as the product of 
this process, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves. 
Intelligence as organization: Intelligence can be thought of as the units that 
carry out various functions.26 
The final goal of intelligence is producing written documents to support the 
decision-making process of politicians, managers, and leaders. The documents can be 
reports, bulletins, notices, and briefs. Intelligence products have to "meet six 
principles... - accuracy, objectivity, usability, relevance, readiness, and timeliness."27 The 
demands are relevant to the competitive intelligence. John Nolan has described 
competitive intelligence with the same demands as state El.28 
The purpose of this chapter is the investigation of a very specific type of 
intelligence - economic intelligence (El). This issue is difficult for research because of the 
top level of secrecy of the intelligence organizations and any intelligence activities as 
well. The approach to the issue of El is based on the analysis of main schools, levels, and 
components of intelligence. The analysis of the open literature represents many facets of 
intelligence art, but it cannot investigate the subject of the research completely. 
26 Mark M.Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy (CQ Press, Washington 2000) p.8. 
27
 Kevin P.Stack, "Competitive Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security, Volume 13, Winter 1998, 
No4,p.l94. 
22 
A.        SCHOOLS OF INTELLIGENCE 
If intelligence activities are opened for public review and analysis, it is only with 
great delay. The delay is from 10 to 50 years. There are two sides to this issue. The face is 
usually unclear and consists of fragmental information. The tail is closed for public 
review and cannot be discussed under any circumstances. This chapter discusses three 
models of intelligence organization that have different characteristics and approaches for 
organizing and conducting intelligence and different viewpoints toward collecting 
information and data. To understand intelligence, it is necessary to start from the analysis 
of an intelligence organizational model using the description of these models. 
The existence of intelligence appeared to be clear during World War I. The 
openness of this organization was realized in some states after WW II. Modern 
intelligence, according to H. Ransom, is developed into three major groups or types that 
are then developed into some particular models, such as British, Soviet, and United States 
models. (See Figure 1) 
INTELLIGENCE 
British Model Soviet Model 
United States 
Model 
Figure 1. Models of Intelligence 
28For more details see John Nolan, Confidential: Uncover Your Competitor's Top Business 
Secrets Legally and Quickly - and Protect Your Own, (Phoenix Consulting Group, 1999), pp. 1 -3. 
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The British is the oldest one. British "intelligence as an institution was a Victorian 
innovation."29 Parliamentary committee controls the British intelligence with Prime 
Minister as the head of the committee. Scientists believe that the Prime Minister actually 
realizes full control over the intelligence organization. Special board of Prime Minister 
Advisors coordinates the British model. The intelligence organization consists of two 
principal branches, Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) and Security Service (MI-5). As 
reported, MI-6 carries intelligence functions and MI-5 - counterintelligence functions. 
They are characterized by the highest level of secrecy and the tremendous lack of 
information on the model; the personal of the services is only civilian. The third element 
of the Britain model was established in 1965 as the Defense Intelligence to support the 
Armed Forces. This model does not have a face, except for the official office that does 
not carry any function except representative. The tail of the British model is the scope for 
research and studies. The representatives of both services never appeared for public 
observation. The services are characterized by the absent of printed documents, and the 
absent of the access to the legal base of this model. The Britain model is the sample for 
many western European states. 
The Soviet model was established after 1917, and came from both the state 
security organization KGB (Department of State Security) and GRU (Main Intelligence 
Directorate) of Armed Forces. The KGB had "the First Chief Directorate (which carried 
out counterintelligence), Second Chief Directorate (responsible for foreign intelligence 
29
 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 15. 
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gathering), and Third Chief Directorate (responsible for internal security)."30 The Soviet 
model had parallel structures, the personnel was the officers of state security and 
department of defense. They competed with each other for the access to the authority and 
influence over it. The main element of this model was human element, an agent, as the 
main source of information, influence, and promoting the socialists and communists 
ideas. The main mission of the Soviet El was both economic intelligence and economic 
espionage. The main target was technologies and scientific information. KGB and GRU 
did El separately. The state coordinated activities of two intelligence agencies. At the 
beginning, the Military-Industrial Commission since 1963 and later General Commission 
of Military-Industrial Complex since 1985 were responsible for coordination. Besides the 
intelligence agencies, some state's agencies like State Committee of Economic 
International Relations, a special department of the National Academy, two departments 
of the Ministry of International Trade also conducted EL 31 
Some information about the Soviet model became available after 1991. The 
socialist block states used the model as basis for establishing their own intelligence 
organizations. The tail of the model was its high level of conspiracy and repression. The 
organization was used as a revolutionary and terrorist tool for promoting ideas of 
communism. Access to information about the organization was delayed throughout the 
state system weaken control over the Soviet model intelligence organization. 
30 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Volume 6, 15™ edition, p. 338. 
31
 Alexander Kolpakidy, Dmitryi Prohorov, Imperia of GRU, Moscow, (Olma-Press, 1999). Available 
[online]: http://www.agentura.ru/dosie/gru/imperia/razryadka/; accessed January 21, 2001. 
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The United States model is the young one and most complicated. It was created as 
the answer to the demands of WWII, which brought new demands on coordination of the 
intelligence by the state. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was the coordinator of all 
intelligence activities during WWII. At the end of the war, the OSS was disbanded. 
However, the United States model was eventually abandoned and rebuild as an 
intelligence organization. The necessity to coordinate intelligence was later realized by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA has supported the National Security 
Council (NSC) since 1947. The CIA advises the President and NSC on all foreign 
intelligence activities, and it coordinates, links, evaluates, and disseminates intelligence 
within the U.S. government. The CIA combines the three principal functions: foreign 
intelligence, external counterintelligence, and clandestine political operations and 
psychological as well. The CIA's director plays the principal role in the US intelligence 
system. The director is the president's adviser, a member of NSC, and a chairman of the 
United States Intelligence Board, and the Council of the US Intelligence Community. The 
Community consists of the CIA, the State Department, and the Defense Department, 
mainly DIA, the National Security Agency, plus representatives from the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 
B.        LEVELS OF INTELLIGENCE 
This classification of intelligence is based on the size and scale of the organization 
that conducts El and the importance of El for the organization. The levels of intelligence 
are strategic or national, operational or corporational, and tactical or combat. (See Figure 
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2) The levels that are proposed are based on the analysis of organizational structures and 
targets. The classification was preferable for the Soviet intelligence system and is widely 
used by many organizations throughout the world, and is relevant to the organizational 









Figure 2. Levels of Intelligence 
Strategic or national, for example, intelligence activities are conducted for a state, 
an international corporation. The strategic objects are divided mostly into political, 
military, economic, and other objects. The economic objects can be critical industries, 
natural resources, industrial centers, and transnational corporations that operate within the 
area of the organizational responsibility or control. For instance, the activities of Japanese 
car making transnational corporations are important for both the US government and 
domestic car transnational corporations. A strategic level is very critical for the state 
because the globalization of economy, scientific revolution, and development of nuclear 
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weapons has dissoluted the national borders and weakened the state's ability to protect 
itself. 
On the other hand, these processes initiated rapid changes in political, economic, 
and technological societies that require from state the ability to envisage the future 
problems. The state is also responsible for creating a favorable legal base both internal 
and external. The former is a domestic legal system, regulations, and acts. The latter is the 
system of bilateral and multilateral agreements on particular issues of economic activities. 
Both internal and external legal frames set the national economic security system, the 
goals of the El and its responsibilities. There are four types of the strategic level of 
intelligence. They are "basic, current, warning, and estimative." 32 
Operational or corporation intelligence has a smaller area of responsibility and is 
realized by smaller organizations than strategic or national intelligence. The best 
examples are probably the activities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence that 
are responsible for a lower scale of intelligence than the Defense Intelligence Agency. 
The activities within some markets, such as energy, high tech, and air industry are another 
example of this level. 
The operational level was more common for the intelligence system of the former 
USSR. This type of intelligence organization could be encountered in the Armed Forces. 
It was responsible for producing intelligence for the chief of great units up to the chief of 
the military regions, and operational military groups. In the economy, this level is suitable 
for national corporations, national industries, and branches of government, and science 
32
 For more details read Kevin P.Stack, "Competitive Intelligence," Intelligence and National Security, 
Volume 13, Winter 1998, Number 4, P. 197. 
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within national borders. The operational level gives a smaller scale of the analysis 
represented in the intelligence report, but it is very useful for making decisions on this 
level of management and control. 
Tactical or combat intelligence is the smallest in scale and scope. This intelligence 
is conducted by the smaller organizations. A military example is the intelligence of 
battalion level or less, and intelligence for collecting data about development of some 
specific product, such as CPU, an aircraft, or new material for a particular industry. 
The combat or tactical level originated from the necessity to provide intelligence 
for small organizational unit. It is more narrow, and informative. The time line is very 
important for this level. The time is the most important quality for this type of 
intelligence because the organizations that are acting on this level share in common 
capabilities that only a few pieces of information multiplied by time factor could become 
critical for achieving advantages over adversary or counter partner organization. 
Porter proposes a special classification of the levels of El that have four-level 
functions of El. They are 
• the primary level that refers to firm level; 
• an intermediate stage (inter-professional and local networks, such as 
strategic alliances between the financial services community and 
information technology developers to liberate the movement of capital and 
financial information); 
• the national level (linked strategies between different - government, 
business, labor - decision-making centers, favored in more corporatist 
political environments and most apparent in continental Europe and 
Japan); 
• the transnational level (through strategic alliances undertaken by firms of 
all sizes) or the international level (strategic influence pursued by nation- 
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states bilaterally, and multilaterally, as exemplified by the European 
Union's support for the transnational research networks of its Member 
States, or Canada's various bilateral research and development agreements 
with other states).33 
• Next, Potter uses Martres' typology of the types of EL They are the 
following: 
• Primary and Secondary economic intelligence 
• Tactical economic intelligence 
• Clandestine economic intelligence34 
This typology is based on the accessibility of the economic data. The first and 
second types are open economic information, and some pieces of research. Everyone with 
minimum time requirements can obtain them. The tactical level of El has limited access 
requiring special skills, governmental, professional, or public position from the collector 
or user of this information. Clandestine type of El deals with highly classified economic 
information that is limited in access. This information can be obtained by using human or 
technical intelligence. (E. Potter, 25) (For more details, see Typology of Economic 
Intelligence in Table 1). 
33
 Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, (Carleton University Press, 1998), p.24. 
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Table 1. Typology of Economic Intelligence 
Characte 
ristic 
Primary Secondary Tactical Clandestine 
Color 
code 
Green zone Yellow zone Red Zone Black Zone 
Access Accessibility is greatest; 
everyone can observe. 
Information is available (in 
hard copy or electronically) 
through simple procedures that 
can be undertaken by the non- 
specialist (e.g., by mail, 
through the Internet or other 
electronic bulletin boards, 
faxliriks, 1 -800 numbers, etc.) 
Because of differing legal 
systems and disclosure 
regimes, the level of access to 
information varies from 
country to country. 
Although the availability 
of economic intelligence 
is not as widespread 
because of scarcity of 
supply, high cost, or the 
need for specialist know- 
how (e.g., techniques to 
access particular data- 
bases), it is still freely 
accessible and in the 
public domain. 
This type of information 
is usually in the form of 
published text, whether 
in hard copy or electronic 
form. An example of this 
would be some statistics 
publications of Canada 
(e.g., Canadian 
Economic Observer) on 
macro-economic trends, 
or it can refer to sector 
studies (e.g., the 
telecommunications 
sector in Germany) sold 
by subscription or by, 
say, the Canada-German 
Chamber of Commerce. 
Economic intelligence is 
"tactical" when it concerns 
information that is more 
difficult to acquire and that 
has a degree of 
confidentiality. 
This type of information, 
whose acquisition under 
certain circumstances could 
be unethical, is usually 
acquired through primary 
research (e.g., interviews, 
oral communications). It 
can also be acquired from 
client surveys (formal and 
informal), industry 
conversations, and 
consultants (e.g., Canadian 
Corporate R+D Database). 
Here, the raw information 
provided from levels one 
and two is treated with a 
higher level of analysis and 
can be translated into the 
strategies and tactics used 
by firms in their industries, 
their ability to launch new 
products, and 
organizational restructuring 
(i.e., activities internal to 
the firm). 
Economic intelligence of a "strategic" nature 
concerns that information whose 
accessibility is sophisticated, difficult and 
delicate. It consists, for example, of 
identifying the future intentions and 
capacities of competitors (firm or state). 
This type of information is frequently sought 
by managers, intelligence services, and the 
many professional groups (lawyers, 
consultants, agents) who act as purveyors of 
his information to one or more firms or 
states. The challenge for the initiator of this 
type of information is to integrate scarce 
information into comparative advantage, 
whether at the level of the firm or the 
nation-state. 
Because of the scarcity and hence high value 
of the information, there is an incentive for 
the individual, the firm, or the state to 
overstep the boundaries of the ethical 
standards and use illegal methods, in order 
to be more competitive. The compilation of 
numerous sources of this highly scarce 
information may thus lead to a "strategic" 
economic intelligence. An example of this 
could be the prior knowledge by one firm or 
state of the intentions of a competitor firm oi 
state during the international tendering of a 
multi-million dollar contract to, say, 




Everything that is not 
prohibited is supposedly 
allowed. 
Open access. 
Everything that is not 
prohibited is supposedly 
allowed. 
Open access. 
Everything that is not 
prohibited is supposedly 
allowed. 
Conditions on access 
(security personnel or 
ethical considerations). 
Everything that is not authorized is not 
allowed. 
Access is given only to specific private 
and state sector personnel. 
If access is unauthorized, it is clandestine. 
Type Open information. Open information (90%). Partially open or sensitive 
information. 








Trade secret infraction. 
Infractions of criminal and commercial 
law. 
Physical or electronic penetration of public 
administration. 
Physical or electronic penetration of firms. 
From Ref. [Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, Carleton University Press, 1998, pp..26-28] 
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Two types of classification are useful for the analysis of El.  The intelligence of 
any level has goals in the strategic meaning to evaluate 
information about the capabilities and intentions of foreign governments, 
or any processed information sought by the policy councils of one group 
about another. 'Intelligence' is often misused as a term synonymous with 
'espionage,' which is only one of many methods for collecting 
intelligence.35 
Espionage will be discussed later in this chapter. Strategic intelligence on the state 
level of operations, "evaluates information concerning such things as the strength, 
activities, and probable courses of action of other nations who are usually, but not 
necessarily, opponents."36 The information collected on every level can consist from a 
higher or lower level of intelligence. It is important for the intelligence organization to 
establish and maintain the maximum exchange of information for producing valuable 
intelligence. 
The final goal of intelligence activity is the presentation of a useful report that is 
helpful in producing the managerial decision for either a chief of state or a company. 
Next, intelligence presents the forecasting report with high level of support. The 
intelligence report has to facilitate the head of state or chief of the organization to make 
more rational and successful decision. After that, intelligence has two options in its 
activity, either continue the collection of information concerning the object or stop it. The 
decision is based on the importance of the object and demands for such a type of 
intelligence. 
•" The Encyclopedia Americana, International Edition, Volume 15, Crolier, Dunbury, Connecticut. 
3f> The New Encyclopedia Britanica, Volume 6, Chicago, 15™ edition. 
32 
C.   COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE 
Another approach for intelligence classification is dividing it into components. 
Such components are political, economic, and military. The next group is the 
informational base of intelligence consisting of scientific and technological information, 
geographic information, and biographic information. All components are presented in the 















Figure 3. Components of Intelligence 
The security of the organization in any form is based on the three principal 
frames. They are political, economical, and military frame. The intelligence components 
stem from this assumption. The political component of intelligence deals with a broad 
range of political problems. It is responsible for producing political intelligence requiring 
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regular and efficient analysis. The political component is based on diplomatic information 
that must use information about political and state leaders, political contest, and social 
opinion. State departments and embassies are involved in the realization of political 
intelligence. Besides political function, "Japan's embassies provide extraordinary support 
to its business community."37 Such intelligence uses political theories in producing 
reports by using covert and overt means in acquiring the information. The economic 
component of intelligence is responsible for producing economic intelligence based on 
information about resources, industry, transportation, finance, trade, economic trends and 
indicators, such as gross national product, level of inflation of national currencies, and 
economic growth. It also covers economic events, such as recessions, economic 
competition, economic achievements, sanctions, hunger and so on. Unfortunately, there is 
not any universal definition of the El for both governmental and private economy. There 
is a variety of terms, such as political and economic risk analysis, business or competitive 
intelligence. All these kinds of intelligence have the same intelligence cycle and use 
similar methods. Included in El are two parts: first, intelligence and, second, 
counterintelligence.38 
The military component collects information concerning the organizational 
structure, armaments, equipment, size, location, goals of combat training, and levels of 
readiness of armed forces. The goals of the military component are divided into missions 
37
 Jeffrey W.Wright, "Intelligence and Economic Security," Internationaljournal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, Volume 5, No2, p.211. 
38
 For more detail, see Glenn Hastedt, "Seeking Economic Security Through Intelligence," International 
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 11, No4, Winter 1998-1999. 
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of peace and war. The primary goal of the military component is forewarning against a 
surprise invasion in the time of peace. Wartime adds to the collection special operations, 
such as diversions, capturing the prisoners and documents, samples of the armaments and 
equipment. 
Therefore, intelligence is a synthesized product, consisting of many elements. The 
process of producing intelligence requires using political, economic, and military 
information. It also uses the information collected by components of intelligence and 
additional information in every particular case. Scientific and technological information is 
important for analyzing the scientific and technical issue in nuclear research, armaments, 
new materials, cosmonautic explorations, new types of communications, and many 
others. Geographical data can reinforce both the analysis and synthesis of the information 
for producing reports. Geographic information usually includes data on topography, 
climate, seashore, population, communication net and its capabilities, facts from 
geographic history, locations of industrial centers, capitals, and others data. Biographic 
information can be very useful for intelligence. It can enforce intelligence reports; it can 
offer some clues in resolving some puzzles because of the critical role of mankind in 
decision making process. The behavior and analysis of the organization requires studying 
personal data of the leaders of the organization. This data can help to predict the 
opponent's strategy from negotiations to direct aggressive actions. 
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D. ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE 
There is a range of definitions concerning El. They are economic intelligence, 
economic espionage, industrial espionage, and competitive or business intelligence. The 
forms of El have particular differences that separate each form from another. The chart of 
El structure presents four types of El. (See Figure 4) 
Figure 4. Economic Intelligence Structure 
Harold Ford, a former deputy assistant secretary for functional analysis and the 
research bureau of intelligence and research US Department of State, talks about "a 
misunderstanding of the appropriate role of economic intelligence compared to other 
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intelligence factors."39 He argues that El is a traditional function of the intelligence 
community. First, economic policies need El support.  Second, the monitoring of 
technological development is an important issue for national security. Third, the existing 
threat to the national economy requires active counterintelligence measures. 
A Consumer's Guide to Intelligence says that El is "intelligence regarding foreign 
economic resources, activities, and policies, including the production, distribution, 
consumption of goods and services, labor, finance, taxation, commerce, trade, and other 
aspects of the international economic system."40 An important role of El is to support 
national ES. A quite different approach to El is proposed by S. Porteous. He says that El 
is policy or commercially relevant economic information, including 
technological data, financial, proprietary commercial and government 
information, the acquisition of which by foreign interests could, either 
directly or indirectly assist the relative productivity or competitive position 
of the economy of the collecting organization's country.41 
The second definition emphasizes assistance to 'the relative productivity or 
competitive position' that is critical for economic success. The collecting of economic 
information is a legal, open process. It is not considered an illegal manner, such as a 
clandestine, coercive, and deceptive approach. Moreover, El is designated to provide the 
collecting organization with sufficient economic intelligence for making correct, long- 
lasting and timely decisions. Yet, El cannot serve as the subversive information for 
39
 Randall M.Fort, Economic Espionage: Problems and Prospects, (Consortium for the Study of 
Intelligence, 1993), p.2. 
40
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gaining personal advantages for the direct losses of another organization. This is the main 
difference between economic intelligence and economic espionage. The activities of El 
are concentrated on issues that can affect national security and interests. It presents 
mostly macroeconomic data and economic analysis. Most of the state's El organizations 
do not conduct industrial espionage; whereas, some states actively use economic 
espionage. Economic espionage differs from El mostly in methods. Porteous' definition 
stresses this difference. The forms of El have different intensity on each level of 
intelligence. (See Table 2) 
Table 2. Levels of Economic Intelligence Activity 
Proposed by Author 
Levels of Intelligence/ 
Levels of Economy 
Form of El Strategic Operational Tactical 
























"Economic espionage is the use of, or facilitation of, illegal, clandestine, coercive 
or deceptive means by foreign government or its surrogates to acquire economic 
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intelligence."42 Economic espionage deals not only with economic data either financial or 
managerial, but also with technologies, products, engineering decisions, and new 
materials. Economic espionage is "the clandestine acquisition of economic, financial, 
trade, and /or proprietary information by an official intelligence service using intelligence 
sources and methods."43 Randall M.Fort argues that this type of intelligence is natural 
for intelligence agency. He sees the problem in providing such intelligence to the private 
sector. 
Next, industrial espionage is similar to economic espionage, but it is conducted by 
private business' organizations that act on their behalf. "Industrial espionage is the use 
of, or facilitation of, illegal, clandestine, coercive or deceptive means by private sector 
entity or its surrogates to acquire economic intelligence." 44 Industrial espionage has a 
very long history. For example, China lost its secret of porcelain to the merchants from 
Europe between 1712 and 1722. This is one of the first known cases of industrial 
espionage.45 Competition of any scale forces the companies to conduct industrial 
espionage. It is dangerous when the international companies are involved. "Industrial 
espionage is most dangerous when it touches on national security, a comparatively recent 
Samuel D.Porteous, "Economic Espionage: Issue Rising from Increased Governmental Involvement with 
Private Sector," Intelligence and National Security, Volume 9, October 1994, No4, 737. 
43
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Washington, 1993), p.23. 
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development of our technological age."46 The high cooperation between the state and 
private business can threaten the national security of other states by collecting 
information on sensitive military, nuclear technologies. 
The definition of competitive intelligence (CI) is different from others, but it is 
close to El. In addition, competitive intelligence is similar to business intelligence. The 
representatives of CI claim that they acquire El by using only legal methods. The methods 
of the CI are "examining published information sources, conducting interviews, and 
using other legal, ethical methods. Using a variety of analytical tools, a skilled CI 
professional can fill by deduction any gaps in information already gathered."47 Therefore, 
CI is a form of offensive intelligence because it collects required information for 
producing economic intelligence. It does not act as the defender of any organization 
economic secrets. The importance of CI stems from the necessity of bigger informational 
support for modern business. For example, many companies, like GMC, Xerox, IBM, and 
Motorola, use CI. "Of the 100 largest economies in the world, 51 are corporations, and 
only 49 are countries. Wal-Mart is the bigger than Israel, Poland or Greece. Mitsubishi is 
bigger than Indonesia. General Motors is bigger than Denmark."48 Certainly, the 
corporations conduct CI. Thus, "General Motors' budget for 'competitive intelligence' 
46
 Vincent and Nan Burranelli, Spy/Counterspy, An Encyclopedia of Espionage, McGraw-Hill Book 
Company, 166. 
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alone exceeds the entire budget of the French foreign intelligence service." 49 The growth 
of the CI organizations indicates the higher demands on El from medium and small 
business that cannot afford to conduct their own El. The following table (Table 3) 
presents the analysis of CI conducted by the private sector of economy. It classifies the 
private enterprises into three groups: large, medium, and small, based on their annual 
Table 3. Patterns of Competitive Intelligence Targets by Size of 
Company 
revenues. 
Company Size CI Collection Target 
Protection 
Anti-CI Opponent 


















From Ref. [John Nolan, Getting to Know Your Competition - Without Them Getting to Know All 
About You. Available [online]: //www.intellpros.com/howcollect.html, accessed April 25,2000-1 
Next, there are many approaches to the El process. The intelligence process is a 
cycle. The cycle is the required procedure of obtaining draft information or data, 
collecting and analyzing it, producing intelligence and distributing it. The immense and 
unsystematic acquisition of information is not a rational way of spending intelligence 
resources. First, intelligence has to establish goals, purposes, and priorities tightly 
49
 Evan H.Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, (Carleton University Press, 1998) p.58. 
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connected with a time line. This can save available resources, increase efficacy within 
existing constraints. The planning phase should be implemented on the department level 
and state level as well. The second phase is collecting information. This stage is done in 
both an overt and covert manner. The overt activities present 80-90% of all activities. The 
data differs from state to state and from organization to organization. The open sources 
could be news media, official statistics, reports, and a relatively new source - e- 
information. Mark Lowenthal states seven steps of the intelligence process. They are 
"identifying requirements; collection; processing and exploitation; analysis and 







Figure created based on the model of M.Lowenthal 
Figure 5. Intelligence Process 
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 Mark M.Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secret to Policy, (CQPress, Washington, 1999) p.40. 
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The main distinguishing point of this model is the feedback providing sufficient 
information for adjusting any phase and making corrections. The competitive El has 
similar stages: tasking, defining requirements, collection activities, processing, analysis, 
and dissemination. M.Lowenthal argues that the intelligence process can be conducted in 
a linear or circular approach. If the mission of intelligence is a one-time mission than it 
can be conducted in a linear way, for instance negotiation, or a technical innovation. 
Dissemination Define Requirements 
Analysis Collection Activities 
Source:http:John Nolan, Confidential: Uncover Your Competitor's Top 
Business Secrets Legally and Quickly - and Protect Your Own, New York, 
1999. Available [online]: //www.intellpros.com/howcollect.html, 
accessed January 25, 2001 
Figure 6. Competitive Intelligence Collection Model 
The constant targets of intelligence require the permanent collection of 
information, for example in competition between the carproducers' France, Italy, and 
German for the European market. They require the circular intelligence process. Feedback 
is an important element of the intelligence process for both linear and circular models. 
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The competitive intelligence model proposed by J.Nolan does not have a feedback phase, 
but each phase is designed for correction and self-adjustment. Therefore, both models are 
similar and practical. 
In conclusion, El exists in two forms: governmental and non-governmental. It 
uses legal and illegal methods that create many definitions of this activity. There are some 
interlinks among all forms of EL They can be different because of the different 
socioeconomic, political, legal, and cultural frames within the state. The state 
organization plays a dominant role in the development of the forms of El and their 
cooperation. Each form of El, except the competitive intelligence, act in a defensive and 
offensive manner. They can change their preferences due to a change in the political and 
economical goals, and legal foundation, but they cannot be separated from cultural roots. 
Culture requires a lot of time for any change. Some indicators of cultural changes are 
evident through the analysis of the educational system of state and, especially, its 
intelligence educational programs. Additionally, El is an element of a higher system, 
which is economic intelligence system of state. Therefore, the analysis of EIS can give a 
better picture of the El of modern state. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF STATE'S ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS 
The goal of this chapter is to analyze the economic intelligence systems and to 
elaborate on the proposition for creating and developing state economic intelligence. 
The development of El led to creating an economic intelligence system (EIS). 
There are different types of EIS that have similar and different features. The investigation 
of EIS can better help us to understand the benefits of El and to find some problems in 
the system that have to be fixed. The typology of EIS differs from the schools of 
intelligence discussed in Chapter H 
"Economic intelligence system refers to the cumulative practices and strategies of 
information use, developed in every country at different levels of organization - the 
government (federal and sub federal), industry, firms, education, and the population as 
hole."51 Prominent countries with EIS are Canada, the United States, Japan, France, 
Germany, and the Russian Federation. Potter offers excellent analysis for these countries 
with EIS except for the Russian Federation. The state El that is recognized by an 
intelligence community is only a part of EIS. The El process is the collaboration of many 
governmental and non-governmental organizations within EIS. These phases of the El 
process were discussed earlier in Chapter U, D. Economic Intelligence. The revolution in 
communications has stimulated the development of the new informational technologies, 
which has led to the creation of the new informational society. Both technological and 
51
 Evan HJPotter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, (Carleton University Press, 1998), p.24. 
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informational development stimulated the production and dissemination of economic 
intelligence. Potter gives five major effects of the informational society: 
globalization; 
fragmentation, decentralization, and democratization (for example, 
proliferation, knowledge-based companies, the increased role of sub- 
national governments, and the multiplication of players involved in the 
process of governance); 
less possibility for secrecy; and 
the blurring of boundaries between industries, between public and private 
sectors, between goods and services, and between states, all of which has 
led to the need for new alliances and relationships and the need to rethink 
conceptual categories. In short, the collection and distribution of economic 
intelligence is being democratized as the result of advances in information 
technology and the emergence of an information society. 52 
All effects stimulate a higher level in the openness of the informational society; 
nevertheless, many issues are not so easy to access, such as financial and managerial 
information, which is not so open for analysis. Financial information requires additional 
checking, despite the fact that the data is openly distributed in many cases. The 
managerial data is closed for public access and requires great effort to collect. Any delay 
in receiving managerial information can cost the enterprise tremendous losses of revenue 
or even a share of the market. Therefore, the informational society can benefit from the 
reduction of resources for collecting some part of economic information, but it cannot 
permit El to rely on open sources of economic information. The democratization of 
collection and distribution of economic intelligence raises a problem of democratic 
control over intelligence. According to T. Bruneau, ".. .democracies must establish a clear 
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and comprehensive legal framework. .. .if the legal framework is not clear and explicit, 
intelligence agencies can never be brought under control."53 Therefore, EIS has to 
function within a comprehensive legal frame that will maintain the highest level of its 
control. 
It is necessary to classify the principal characteristics of EIS. First, there are the 
elements of EIS. These are the government, parliament, and court branches; intelligence 
community, main economic agencies, departments of the state, and non-governmental 
state's economic players, for instance, Chamber of Commerce, foreign economic players, 
scientific institutions, and private analytical organizations. Second, all elements of the 
state economy have their own strategy, accomplish their missions, and cooperate with 
other's elements. The activities are conducted in accordance with the state law or illegally. 
The classification of known activities of economic players of EIS includes ten possible 
scenarios. The following table of the functioned taxonomy of national EIS presents all of 
them. (See Table 4) 
52 Evan H.Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, (Carleton University Press, 1998), p.30. 
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Table 4. Functional Taxonomy of National Economic Intelligence 
Systems 
1 An aggressive global program of economic intelligence-collection largely through 
overt means. 
2 An aggressive global program of economic intelligence-collection including 
significant covert means. 
3 A more defensive global program of economic intelligence-collection (concentrating 
on preventing economic espionage). 
4 A high level of cooperation among public sector and private sector users and 
producers of economic intelligence. 
5 An intermediate level of cooperation among public sector users and producers of 
economic intelligence. 
6 A low level of cooperation among public sector users and producers of economic 
intelligence. 
7 An active indigenous private market for economic intelligence. 
8 An active private market for economic intelligence with a high degree of foreign 
control. 
9 A high-level of awareness regarding the importance of economic intelligence at the 
level of the individual firm. 
10 A low-level of awareness regarding the importance of economic intelligence at the 
level of the individual firm. 
From Ref. [Evan H.Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, Carleton 
University Press, 1998,54.] 
A.        ANALYSIS OF MODELS OF ECONOMIC INTELLEGENCE SYSTEM 
Based on the classification of EIS, it is possible to set the models of EIS. The 
models reflect specific features of national EIS. They improve the analysis of EIS, 
reorganize the models if needed, emphasize the strategy to counter actions of the hostile 
state or organization of a particular state. They also help to predict the method of El, 
which is more preferable for a particular EIS in organizing and conducting El. Even 
though Potter's model of classification does not discuss the issue of the education of 
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intelligence personnel, an educational system also facilitates to analyze of EIS. Therefore, 
it should be included in model. First, it opens El strategy and main objectives. Second, 
the surveillance of educational system enforces the collection of data on personnel that 
may be involved in El activities. Table 5 gives the comparison of EIS: 
Table 5. Comparison of National Economic Intelligence Systems 
(Using Categories from Table 4) 
COUNTRY PUBLIC/PRIVATE ORGANIZATION Focus 
Canada Highly decentralized economic intelligence system, with 
30 federal departments and agencies with 128 missions 
abroad;    competitive    national   business    association 
environment (Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Alliance 
of Manufactures and Exporters of Canada, Business 
Council on National Issues). 
3, 6, 8, 
10 
France Ministere des Finances acts as super-ministry for other 
government departments. 
2, 5, 8, 
10 
Britain Department of Trade and Industry plays key role, as does 
the City. 
1,5,7,9 
United States Decentralized   economic   intelligence   system:   recent 
attempts at executive level to better organize the flow of 
strategic information. 
2, 5, 7, 
10 
Germany The private  sector,  through chambers  of commerce 
(whose membership is mandatory), is the hub of the 
economic intelligence system; also playing leading roles 
are the Länder. 
2,4,7,9 
Japan Collective culture is important, especially in binding 
government departments with conglomerates. 
1,4,7,9 
From Ref. [Evan H.Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, Carleton University 
Press, 1998, p.55.] 
Next, the discussions on the structure of EIS enhances the awareness of the whole 
analysis of state EIS and the integration of the separate elements of the system. It gives a 
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better understanding of how EIS works and who is the main player of the system. Potter 
argues about the next three elements that are important for investigating EIS: 
• In some countries, with a more individualist and less information sharing 
ethos, government acts more as a facilitator in the marketplace than a 
player in its own right, and focuses on creating a level playing field 
(business transparency) and the right macro-economic conditions to 
facilitate the achievement of economic growth. 
• In other countries, with a more collectivist or statistic approach, 
government aims to protect and build national industries ("national 
champions") and to participate directly in the marketplace as well as to 
provide the private sector through regular and formal channels with 
extensive services information. 
• Finally, some national economic intelligence systems are characterized by 
a greater complimentary between the public and private sectors, with no 
one actors having the leading role in the provision of economic 
intelligence.54 
The freedom of entrepreneurial activities, an open market-based economy, and a 
democracy of state-societal relations make the exchange of economic information easier 
than closed state-based economy societies. Therefore, competitive intelligence satisfies 
the informational need in a more open society. It requires minimal state involvement into 
micro-economic informational exchange. If the state-based economy is dominant, the role 
of the state El is key for satisfying the need of the state in economic intelligence. 
...[T]he larger the role of government in a particular economy, the less 
effective will be private sector services and the more important will be 
intermediaries or agent, which in turn increases the likelihood of illegal or 
unethical acts to acquire economic intelligence, since the proportion of 
information classified as 'tactical' will be greater.55 
54 
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The analysis of national EIS below shows the principal elements of each system 
and outlines particular features that transform each system into a model. 
1.        Economic Intelligence System of Canada 
The role of the state El, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) is 
mainly defensive. The system has achieved a low level of informational exchange. The 
mandate of state El demands informational support and estimate to the government on 
covert activities of foreign states in Canada. E.Potter stresses many malfunctions of the 
Canadian EIS. The principal problems are caused by the absence of a national security 
strategy for the economy, a weak distributional system of economic intelligence, and the 
strong position of foreign companies in the non-governmental EL The private sector does 
not pay a lot of attention to economic intelligence. All participants of Canadian economy 
are presented in the following figure. Their connections show the links of the economic 
actors. The figure shows that the state is not a central element of the national EIS. (See 
Figure 7) 
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From Ref. [Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, 
Carleton University, 1998, 33.] 
Figure 7. Economic Intelligence in the Canadian Economy 
The Canadian EIS has potential for development of its system by active 
involvement of its ethnic communities and its labor force, but first the state has to 
establish its economic intelligence policies. Porteous foresees three options: 
• An alliance with intelligence services of countries whose economic 
interests are almost indistinguishable from Canada's: the NAFTA 
option. 
• An independently functioning economic intelligence system based 
strictly on Canadian economic and commercial interests... 
• A combination of the above: the compete and cooperate at the 
same time option.56 
5
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In conclusion, the Canadian model is a sample of an open economic society that 
has many weaknesses. It has to enforce its economic security to protect its position in 
world trade. Its economic intelligence strategy may be revised to enforce economic 
development of the state. A higher level of cooperation with EIS in the US is a possible 
direction of development for Canadian EIS. 
2.        Economic Intelligence System of France 
France has a long history of promoting one united nation. It also maintains the 
French currency zone that is the area of its political, economic, and military domination. 
There is an evident shift from "relative indifference to trade and economic matters to an 
increased focus on trade negotiations, macroeconomics trends, and the economic impacts 
of so-called cooperative security concerns."57 The main concern of French EIS is the 
promotion of the national economy through international trade and the priority of gaining 
technological development with the help of its EIS. The state takes control over all 
economic intelligence activities. 
The activities of French Department of Defense clearly present the strategy of the 
French EIS. For example, the Main Directorate of Armament (DGA) with its 85 billion 
francs is creating the system of 'strategic economic intelligence.' The French DOD 
created the department of surveillance of economic research, Observatoire d'Etudes 
Economiggue, (OEE) in 1998. The director of OEE is Nicole Chee, a professor of 
economy of the  University of Paris  who  worked  for the  improvement  in the 
57
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competitiveness of French military industry.58 The following figure clearly shows the 
central role of the state in EIS of France. There is a lack of the link between the state and 
the private informational market. (See Figure 8) 
From Ref. [Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, 
Carleton University, 1998, 65.] 
Figure 8. Economic Intelligence in the French Economy 
The main efforts of the French state in technological collection are "computers, 
aerospace, and production tools and processes."59 To better understand the strategic goals 
of the state it is necessary to analyze its budget and educational system. Therefore, among 
the graduates of the French Military Academy, Saint-Sir, were 12 valedictorian graduates 
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who received prizes for thesis research on intelligence issue. Some of the theses were 
dedicated to economic intelligence, for example, the analysis of the American special 
services' operation against the position of French Oil Company, Total.60 Modern French 
EIS is controlled by the state and reflects the increased need in conducting both defensive 
and offensive El. The strategy of French El is mostly aggressive including many covert 
activities. The state supports a moderate level of cooperation between the state El and 
private sectors of the economy. Some national economic champions are producers of 
military and technological products. Small companies are not supported by state El, and 
are, therefore, not so aware of their economic security. 
3. Economic Intelligence System of Germany 
State intelligence is concentrating its effort, according to August Hunning, the 
chief of Federal Intelligence Service of Germany, on regional conflicts, and proliferation 
of weapons of mass distraction. The surveillance of economic activities in German 
companies abroad, terrorism, and illegal immigration are also the areas of German 
intelligence activities. The state El has both a defensive and offensive nature.61 The 
present German EIS is a web of structures "at the federal, sub-federal, and industrial 
levels. The German economy has been constructed on the principle of a common national 
60
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Strategie goal recognized by all the major economic actors."62 The industrial 
conglomerates substitute the role of the state, as the manager of EL Nevertheless, the 


















From Ref. [Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, 
Carleton University, 1998, 63.] 
Figure 9. Economic Intelligence in the German Economy 
The high participation of private economy in both state economic activities and 
economic intelligence is the main feature of German EIS. The Chambers of Commerce 
act as main centers for the collection and dissemination of economic information. Potter 
says: 
62
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German state has no compunction about creating... an economic 
intelligence system whose objective has been both to systematically 
penetrate foreign firms and governments, with emphasis on France, 
Britain, the United States, and Eastern Europe, and to protect Germany 
from the intelligence systems of these same countries.63 
The traditional preference to rely on national sources of economic information is 
the negative feature of German EIS. The private economy is more concerned about 
conducting El than the state intelligence community. The culture of total suspicion helps 
promote the counter EL 
4.        Economic Intelligence System of Japan 
Japanese EIS became the first sample of a national information-gathering system. 
The system was one of the advantages that boosted the economy of Japan. The national 
strategy of El is offensive. The Japanese cultural approach to the economy stems from the 
word "dantotsu, meaning striving to be the nest of the best.' .. .to achieve superior 
performance."64 Next, cultural tradition does not have to destroy each other in the 
economic competition, and to support sharing of the information. The core of Japanese 
EIS is based "on a synergy of technological, industrial, and commercial strategies that are 
inextricable from an offensive-oriented economic intelligence system."65 The principal 
feature of Japanese EIS is its high level of centralization that combines both state and 
private economy. The centralization leads to the high effectiveness of public and private 
economy. (See Figure 10) Potter identifies five features of Japanese strategic exploitation 
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of information: consideration of global and local markets; conquest of national market 
through cultural arena; preference of long-lasting strategies; connecting national strategy 






A global approach 
to markets 
A futuristic perspective, 
10,20,30 years 
Passage of commercial 
information from secrecy 
to general knowledge 
Economic growth 
through the conquest 
of foreign markets 
Close correlation between 
economic development and 
the defense of national 
 interests  
From Ref. [Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, 
Carleton University, 1998, 59.] 
Figure 10. The Role of Culture in the Japanese Economic 
Intelligence System 
The model of EIS reflects a balanced system that involves all elements of 
governmental and non-governmental EL The evolution of economy and politics in Japan 
led to the close cooperation of politicians and businesspersons. 
65
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As one leading financial journalist said: 'If you do not use politicians, you 
cannot expand business these days in Japan - that's basic. Businessmen 
. provide politicians with funds, politicians provide businessmen with 
information. If you wish to develop a department store, a hotel, or a ski 
resort, you need licenses and permissions and the cooperation of leading 
political figures in the area. And it always useful to hear that a certain area 
is slated for development, preferably several years before development 
starts, when land prices are still low.66 
Fialka gives many examples of Japanese El activities in his book "War by the 
other means."67 The EIS of Japan puts the national economy into the center of the system 
with no separation between the state and private economy for dissemination of economic 
intelligence. Two parts of the economy conduct El by overt and covert means. Moreover, 
the developed system of processing and distribution of economic intelligence enforces the 
national culture of total collection of information, especially economic. 
5.        Economic Intelligence System of Russian Federation 
The Russian EIS is in transition from the Soviet model. The Russian Federal Law 
of External Intelligence provides the legal base for conducting El in article 5: 
• Supporting the President, Parliament, and Government with appropriate 
information   for  making  decisions   on  political,   economic,   defense, 
scientific, technical, and environmental issues. 
• Supporting economic development, scientific and technical progress, 
and military-technical development for Russian Federation.68 
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The following description of Russian EIS is only the viewpoint of the author on 
the situation in the Russian Federation and is based on open sources of information. 
There are two systems of intelligence and economic relations in the state: first, the state 
intelligence system that has to support the decision-making process, collect scientific and 
technological information, and protect economical interest both within the state and 
abroad. The state intelligence suffered a great deal of reorganization and lost its 
professional core, specialists of intelligence and counterintelligence; second, the outflow 
of the professionals that helped create a private informational market. An example of 
such market is the analysis of new literature that reveals many titles dedicated to 
intelligence, counterintelligence,  and economic intelligence.  V.  Duhov's, Economic 
Intelligence and Economic Security, Kiev, 1997, and A. Shavaev's, The System of 
Fighting with Economic Intelligence, Moscow 2000 are designed for managers of the 
economic departments, security services, and systems of education. In addition, R- 
System: Introduction into Economic Espionage, Moscow 1997 that gives the analysis of 
experience of private economic intelligence agency.69 The books dedicated to intelligence 
problems were not available before 1991. Nowadays, in the Russian Federation exists a 
dualistic system of EL The former is the state system and later is the new El private 
sector. These two systems are highly interconnected. Although, they do not have a legal 
base for cooperation, except de-facto, there are many cases of such cooperation. For 
example, the site Compromat.ru has proposed many articles about intensive cooperation 
69
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between many executives, such as B. Berezovskyi and A. Litvinenko, an officer of FSB, 
with the special security services or their representatives.70 The period of 
denationalization of the state property into a private one requires informational support, a 
system of protection, and access to the state power. Such a mission could be 
accomplished by the economic intelligence system. There are two poles in the EIS of the 
Russian Federation. One is the state intelligence community and second one is the private 
information market. There is the absent of the coordination of the El in both poles. The 
low effectiveness of Russian EIS results from decentralization of El and temporal links 
between the research institutes, military-industrial complex and lobbies, private 
enterprises. (See Figure 11) 
From Ref. [Proposed by the author.] 
Figure 11. Economic Intelligence in the Russian Economy 
70
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The future of the Russian EIS is not clear. The team of the Russian president has 
many representatives of the security intelligence, FSB, and the military intelligence, 
GRU. (S. Ivanov, Secretary of Russian Federation Security Council; I. Sechin, deputy 
director of presidential administration; V. Chercussov, a political representative of the 
President in Northern-Western region; V. Ivanov, deputy director of the presidential 
administration, a former chief of economic security department of FSB in Leningrad 
region; Y. Zaostrovtsev, the deputy director of FSB, former director of the Department of 
Economic Security of FSB; Strelkov, a deputy director of the presidential management 
Directorate, a former general of SVR). These people have had a big influence on the 
decision-making process in the Russian Federation.71 
In conclusion, the Russian EIS is transforming. In the future, it could present a 
new model of EIS. Today, two active systems of the state and private El enforce the fast 
transformation of the Russian economy and society as well. 
6.        Economic Intelligence System of United Kingdom (UK) 
The EIS of UK is designed to protect and pursue the state's economic security 
goals and the well being of its citizens. The UK government controls EIS. Its Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS) consists of a counterintelligence department, MI-5, and an 
intelligence one, MI-6. These departments' high level of secrecy does not reveal much 
information. One of the main targets of SIS is economic intelligence. In 1984, P.Midlton, 
the Secretary of the Finance, succeeded in budgeting MI-6 for collecting economic and 
71
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commercial information, after which MI-6 started actively collecting technological and 
economic information. The Committee of External Economic Intelligence controls all El 
activities of the intelligence community, while the Deputy Secretary of Finance controls 
activities of MI-6 in collecting commercial and financial information.72 The role of the 
state is a central one, so it results in the high output of British EIS. (See Figure 12) 
From Ref. [Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, 
Carleton University, 1998, 65.] 
Figure 12. Economic Intelligence in the British Economy 
Clearly, the British system prefers a more aggressive strategy of El. The limited 
natural resources of the UK economy in comparison with US have promoted the 
72
 Stanislav Lekarev, Vladimir Maliovanyi, "Gentlemen Broking Law, Special Services", Independence 
Military Surveillance, No41 (164), 1999. Available [online]: http://www.nvo.ng.ru/spforees/1999-10- 
22/gentlemen.html: accessed May 24, 1999, 8. 
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development of an intermediate level of cooperation among state and private El, where 
the financial institutions and insurance companies are big actors. Therefore, economic 
security is highly important for the private sector. The EIS of the UK is strong enough to 
support the strong economic position of its state. 
7.        Economic Intelligence System of United States (US) 
The American system has the biggest intelligence community and competitive 
intelligence apparatus in the world. The cultural traditions of openness, some gaps in the 
legal base, and unresolved issue of cooperation between the state and private El led to the 
existing decentralized EIS. The state supports a defensive El strategy. Although an 
offensive strategy is possible, it is not widely accepted. Potter says, "there may be a 
cultural resistance to the regular use of unethical and potentially illegal methods of 
obtaining economic intelligence."73 He argues about the discrepancy of growth of the US 
private El and national economy because the economic growth is slower. He thinks that 
the ability of US companies to succeed in business depends more on its long-term 
business cycle, concentration of strategic resources, and cooperation between private and 
state El.74 The big private economic intelligence market does not accomplish the 
managerial function for EIS. The state has to change this situation, and take control over 
the US EIS. The state does not need to substitute the activities of the competitive 
73 Evan H.Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, (Carleton University Press, 1998), p.62. 
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intelligence, but it has to coordinate its activities in accordance with the preferable state 
intelligence strategy. (See Figure 13) 
From Ref. [Evan H. Potter, Economic Intelligence and National Security, 
Carleton University, 1998, 59.] 
Figure 13. Economic Intelligence in the U.S. Economy 
The core of EIS in the US consists of the industrial firms, banks, and insurance 
companies, which have promoted the development of competitive intelligence. However, 
the fast growth of competitive intelligence cannot enhance the state economic security 
because the system does not stimulate the support of economic security for medium and 
small companies. Therefore, the state intelligence community should allocate more 
resources for conducting EL 
65 
8.        Summary 
The following propositions outline the possible steps in creating EIS. First, the 
state has to develop its strategic vision and mission for state intelligence and set the 
borders for competitive intelligence. Second, the objectives need to be set to transform 
the strategic vision and El mission into plans of actions that are connected with time line 
and resource constraints. A legal framework is an important element for establishing 
objectives. Third, the state has to establish a coordinator of EIS. It has to provide the 
control, coordination, and cooperation of all elements of EIS. Each intelligence agency, or 
organization, has to convert or interpret the state objectives into their strategy for 
achieving the objectives of El. Fourth, the implementation and execution of an El strategy 
is the phase of action of EIS. Fifth, the evaluation of the performance and correction of 
the actions of EIS is an important element for achieving the maximum efficiency of EIS. 
There are a few preferences for the development of EIS. First, the intelligence 
community should allocate part of its resources to El activities achieving the following 
goals: 
Produce economic intelligence that is not accessible from open sources El. 
Be capable of producing economic intelligence in wartime condition. 
Coordinate activities of El for all state consumers that are interested in 
economic intelligence. 
Collaborate with intelligence communities of other states in El. 
Conduct comprehensive economic counterintelligence for the state. 
Control the education of personnel for economic intelligence activities. 
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Second, the organizations of open source economic analysis have to be an integral 
part of EIS. The state should support their development and growth to achieve the higher 
economic value of economic intelligence. The use of human intelligence is under specific 
consideration of the state because it is difficult to set the borders of the state economic 
and private economic objectives. Therefore, EIS is an adjustable system for specific 
needs of each state. It can be organized in different ways to get higher performance and 
satisfaction of the economic informational need. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This research confirms that El, which has attracted a lot of attention with the end 
of the Cold War, is a legitimate function of a modern state. The development of modern 
El is the means for enhancing national economic security with two types of EI- 
govemmental and non-governmental. The role of El is secondary in providing economic 
security for the state, but it is critical for the private sector of economy, especially on the 
tactical level. All activities of El are seen in an economic intelligence system providing 
intelligence support for the decision-making process of any economic issue. Lowenthal 
gives possible economic issues using US economy: 
Economics can be subdivided into several issues: U.S. economic 
competitiveness overseas, U.S. trading relations, foreign economic 
espionage and possible countermeasures, and the intelligence community's 
ability to forecast major international economic shifts that may have 
serious consequences for the U.S. economy.75 
There are no simple answers on appropriate use of economic intelligence, since 
there are many models of EIS. However, the most prominent are in Canada, France, 
Germany, Japan, the Russian Federation, and the United States. Each system is designed 
to accomplish a defensive, offensive strategy, or a combination. The legal frame, cultural 
roots, economic relations, political agenda of state, educational system are very important 
elements for establishing and functioning of EIS. 
The government is the lead in controlling EIS. It sets the rules, and it makes the 
decision on the level of cooperation with competitive intelligence and sharing of 
75
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economic intelligence as well. Lowenthal raises the following problems about sharing 
economic intelligence versus protecting sources of information. For example, the state is 
responsible for sharing information with international companies that have shareholders 
in many countries.  This issue has not been developed, and it must be resolved 
individually in each particular case and state. 
Economic intelligence is an element of different activities of intelligence to 
provide for the national security of the state. 
To realize a balanced national security policy designed to promote long- 
term stability, it is necessary to have an objective estimate of the military, 
political, economic, and social factors determining the state's capability to 
provide that security. Such estimate is also crucial for determining the 
optimum distribution of national security resources and how the military's 
efforts interrelate with other methods of security maintenance, such as 
diplomacy and economic policy.76 
Therefore, El must be implemented with other components that support the 
national security system of the state. 
The high level of openness of economic information is questionable in the time of 
war. State intelligence with its unique capabilities can provide the state with a sufficient 
amount of economic intelligence in wartime. 
The following recommendations are suggested for state decision-makers on the 
issue of El: 
• El is not the cure for an economic collapse, but it can enhance the state's 
capabilities in controlling its economy, preventing it from economic 
pitfalls when combined with other means. 
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The state has to develop a strategy creating and implementing EL The 
execution of the strategy will lead to the creation of EIS. 
The acceptance of competitive intelligence depends on the role of the state 
in controlling its economy. If the state allows the participation of 
competitive intelligence, it has to set a strong legal frame for such 
intelligence. The state must decide on the level of cooperation and 
informational exchange within EIS. 
The defensive strategy, economic counterintelligence, is a legal action of 
the state intelligence community. The offensive strategy is an arguable 
issue because it is not accepted by many states. On the other hand, it can 
only be one measure for achieving the objectives. It is widely supported by 
the EIS that must support the economies with limited resources. 
The cooperation among states' intelligence communities or EIS is not a 
well-developed issue. Cooperation is possible when the goals are common 
both economy and security. 
EIS is a unique socio-political organization of state. The developed, well- 
coordinated system can enhance national economic security and support maintenance of 
citizens' well being. 
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